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 Endogenous Domestic Market Structure and the Effects of Trade 





We offer a new perspective to the unionised wage effects of unilateral trade 
liberalisation by considering endogenous domestic market structure. Hence, in 
contrast to the existing works, which focus on the short-run effects of trade 
liberalisation on unionised wage, we focus on more long-run effects by considering the 
effects of trade liberalisation on the domestic market structure. Trade liberalisation 
reduces the number of active domestic firms, but it increases domestic unionised wage 
in the active domestic firms. Although trade liberalisation increases wage in the active 
domestic firms, it reduces domestic employment and total union utility at the free entry 
equilibrium. So, trade liberalisation benefits domestic employed workers by increasing 
unionised wage, but its effect on total domestic workers is not favourable.  
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Government policies and/or technological progress are reducing trade costs significantly in 
recent decades. While the general belief is that trade liberalisation benefits the consumers and 
increases welfare of the importing country, there is concern about its adverse effects on trade 
unions and wages. However, there are other views, which suggest that trade liberalisation may 
increase unionised wage. The factors attributed to the beneficial wage effect of trade 
liberalisation are two-way trade liberalisation, “efficient union-firm bargaining”, Bertrand 
competition, open shop unions and formal-informal productions. The existing literature provides 
interesting insights, yet they are restrictive by considering an exogenous market structure. Hence, 
they show the short-run effects of trade liberalisation on unionised wage. 
 
We offer a new perspective by considering free entry in the domestic country, thus focusing on 
more long-run effects of trade liberalisation through its effect on the domestic market structure. 
We show that trade liberalisation reduces the number of active domestic firms, but it increases 
the unionised wage in the active domestic firms. Trade liberalisation creates an adverse wage 
effect in the short-run, which is characterised by a given number of domestic firms, but it creates 
a favourable long-run wage effect in the active domestic firms by reducing the equilibrium 
number of domestic firms. Although trade liberalisation increases wage in the active domestic 
firms, we show that it reduces domestic employment and total union utility at the free entry 
equilibrium. So, trade liberalisation benefits domestic employed workers by increasing unionised 
wage, but its effect on total domestic workers is not favourable. Endogenous domestic market structure and the effects of trade 
liberalisation in a unionised industry 
 
1. Introduction 
Government policies and/or technological progress are reducing trade costs 
significantly in recent decades. While the general belief is that trade liberalisation 
benefits the consumers and increases welfare of the importing country, there is concern 
about its adverse effects on trade unions and wages. This concern is more severe in 
countries such as Europe, where the presence of labour unions is prominent in many 
countries. As documented in OECD (2004), the proportion of workforce under union 
agreements was 67% in Europe, while it was 14% in the USA.  
Rodrik (1997) points out that globalisation reduce the power of the trade unions 
and create an adverse wage effect. As documented in Niblett (2005), the negative 
perception in the European Union towards increased globalisation is an important 
reason for the rejection of the European Constitution by French and Dutch voters. The 
theoretical results of Huizinga (1993) and Sørensen (1993), which show that unionised 
wage is higher under autarky than under free trade, confirm this concern. 
However, there are other views, which suggest that trade liberalisation may 
increase unionised wage. The factors attributed to the beneficial wage effect of trade 
liberalisation are two-way trade liberalisation (Naylor, 1998 and 1999, Munch and 
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 Skaksen, 2002 and Bastos and Kreickemeier, 2009), “efficient union-firm bargaining”
1 
(Gaston and Trefler, 1995), Bertrand competition (Gūrthzgen, 2002), open shop unions 
(Bastos et al., 2009) and formal-informal productions (Maiti and Mukherjee, 2010). 
The empirical evidence on this topic, although scarce, is also mixed (see, Gaston and 
Trefler, 1995 and Konings and Vandenbussche, 1995). These papers provide interesting 
insights, yet they are restrictive by considering an exogenous market structure. Hence, 
they show the short-run effects of trade liberalisation on unionised wage. 
We offer a new perspective by considering free entry in the domestic country, 
thus focusing on more long-run effects of trade liberalisation through its effect on the 
domestic market structure. We show that trade liberalisation reduces the number of 
active domestic firms, but it increases the unionised wage in the active domestic firms. 
Trade liberalisation creates two opposing effects. For a given number of domestic firms, 
it reduces domestic wage. However, it increases concentration in the domestic industry 
by reducing the number of active domestic firms, thus creating a new effect. Fewer 
domestic firms following trade liberalisation tends to increase the unionised wage in the 
active domestic firms. We find that the latter effect dominates the former, and a 
unilateral trade liberalisation increases unionised wage. Thus, we show that if we 
ignore all the factors creating the beneficial wage effects of trade liberalisation in the 
existing papers, endogenous domestic market structure can be responsible for higher 
unionised wage following a unilateral trade liberalisation. We suggest that trade 
liberalisation creates an adverse wage effect in the short-run, which is characterised by 
                                                        
1  The “efficient bargaining” model, which stipulates that the firms and unions bargain over wages and 
employment, is an alternative to the right-to-manage model, where the firms and unions bargain only 
over wages. See, Layard et al. (1991) for arguments in favour of right-to-manage models.   
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 a given number of domestic firms, but it creates a favourable long-run wage effect in 
the active domestic firms by reducing the equilibrium number of domestic firms. 
Although trade liberalisation increases wage in the active domestic firms, we 
show that it reduces domestic employment and total union utility at the free entry 
equilibrium. So, trade liberalisation benefits domestic employed workers by increasing 
unionised wage, but its effect on total domestic workers is not favourable. 
The reminder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the basic 
model and derives the results. Section 3 concludes. 
 
2. The basic model 
Assume that there is a foreign firm (firm 1), which has invented a technology and 
wants to sell the product in another country, called domestic country. There is large 
number of firms in the domestic country. The domestic firms get the technical 
know-how of the foreign technology through knowledge spillover. These firms can 
compete in the domestic country with a homogeneous product. However, the domestic 
firms decide whether to enter the market. We consider free entry in the domestic 
country, where entry requires a fixed entry cost  . The entry cost can be viewed as 
a fixed investment or the opportunity cost of entering the market. The number of 
domestic firms entering the market is determined endogenously by the zero profit 
condition. Entry in the domestic country occurs until the net positive profit of a 
domestic entrant is positive. For analytical convenience, we will consider the number 
of firms as a continuous variable, unless specified otherwise. 
2 K
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 We consider that the marginal cost of production of firm 1 is constant, thus 
considering a perfectly competitive foreign labour market. We normalise firm 1’s 
marginal cost of production to zero.
2 However, firm 1 faces a per-unit trade cost 
(either due to transportation cost or due to domestic tariff) t.  
  We assume that the labour market in the domestic country is unionised. Each 
domestic firm is paired with a domestic labour union, which determines the wage and 
the corresponding firm hires workers according to its requirement. Hence, we 
consider a right-to-manage model of labour union (see, e.g., Bughin and Vannini, 
1995, Vannini and Bughin, 2000, López and Naylor, 2004 and Bastos and 
Kreickemeier, 2009). For simplicity, we assume that each domestic firm requires one 
worker to produce one unit of output.
3 We also normalise the reservation wage of the 
domestic workers to zero. 
  The inverse market demand function in the domestic country is P = 1 – q, where 
P is price and q is the total output sold. 
  We consider the following game. Given the trade cost, at stage 1, the domestic 
firms decide whether to enter the market. At stage 2, each domestic firm that enters 
the market is paired with a labour union, which determines wage for the paired 
domestic firm. At stage 3, firm 1 and the domestic firms compete like Cournot 
oligopolists. We solve the game through backward induction. 
 If  n domestic firms enter the market (denoting them from 2 to (n+1)) and the 
                                                        
2  Assuming that production requires only labour, we can normalize the labour coefficient of the foreign 
firm to zero to make its marginal cost of production equal to zero. 
3 The higher labour coefficients of the domestic firms compared to the foreign firm may represent 
imperfect knowledge spillover. 
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 unionised wage paid by the ith domestic firm is  ,  i w 2,3,..., 1 in = + , the equilibrium 
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,  2,3,..., 1 in = + .              ( 4 )  
It is clear from (4) that if the number of domestic firms is exogenous, trade 
liberalisation (i.e., a lower t) reduces the domestic unionised wage, which is in line 
with the existing literature. This suggests an adverse short-run wage effect. 
It also follows from (4) that if n reduces, i.e., the number of domestic firms falls, 
the wage in each active domestic firm increases. 
  Given the equilibrium outputs and wage, we get the net equilibrium profit of the 
ith domestic firm as 
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Free entry equilibrium number of domestic firms is determined by  , which 
gives the equilibrium number of domestic firm as 
* 0 i π =
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We assume that at least one domestic firm always enters the market, which implies 
that  162 0 Kt −+ > . 
 
Proposition 1: Trade liberalisation reduces the free entry equilibrium number of 
domestic firms. 
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  The reason for the above result is as follows. Trade liberalisation reduces 
competitiveness of the domestic firms, thus reducing their net profits from entering 
the market and reduces the free entry equilibrium number of domestic firms. 
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Proposition 2: Trade liberalisation increases domestic unionised wage at the free 
entry equilibrium. 
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  As already mentioned, trade liberalisation creates two opposing effects. On the 
one hand, it tends to reduce unionised wage for a given number of domestic firms. On 
6 
 the other hand, it tends to increase unionised wage in the active domestic firms by 
reducing the number of domestic firms. On the balance, the latter effect dominates, 
and trade liberalisation increases unionised wage in the active domestic firms. 
  We show in the Appendix that the above mentioned trade-off holds even under a 
more general union objective function, where the unions give different weights on 
wage and employment, and bargain with the firms for wages. Unfortunately, due to 
the complex expression, we cannot derive an analytical expression like Proposition 2 
under the general union objective function. 
   Now we want to see the effects of trade liberalisation on domestic employment 
and total union utility. 
  At the free entry equilibrium, the equilibrium output of an active domestic firm is 
K, which is also equal to the equilibrium employment in an active domestic firm. 
Hence, total domestic employment at the free entry equilibrium is 
** E nK = . Since 
  reduces with trade liberalisation, we get that trade liberalisation reduces domestic 










  Finally, total union utility at the free entry equilibrium is  . We get 
that 
** * Un w K =
*
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. Trade liberalisation reduces the 
equilibrium number of domestic firms, yet it increases the wage in the active domestic 
firms. We get that the number of firm effect dominates the wage effect, and trade 
liberalisation reduces total union utility. 




Proposition 4:  Trade liberalisation reduces domestic employment and total union 
utility at the free entry equilibrium. 
 
3. Conclusion 
Many countries are liberalising their trade policies, which create concern about their 
effects on domestic labour markets and have attracted significant attention from the 
researchers. Although the existing literature has provided several important insights, it 
is restrictive by considering an exogenously given market structure. We provide a new 
perspective to this literature by considering free entry in the domestic country, thus 
focusing on endogenous market structure. Thus, our paper focuses on more long-run 
effects of trade liberalisation. 
  We show that even if trade liberalisation creates an adverse short-run wage effect, 
it creates a favourable long-run wage effect in the active domestic firms by reducing the 
equilibrium number of domestic firms. While trade liberalisation benefits domestic 
employed workers by increasing unionised wage, its effect on total domestic workers is 









A general union objective function: We show in the Appendix that the trade-off 
mentioned for Proposition 2 holds under a more general union objective function, 
where the unions give different weights on wage and employment, and bargain with 
the firms for wages. 
If there are n domestic firms, wage in the ith domestic firm is determined by 
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where  (0,0.5] δ ∈  ((1 ) δ − )
5 is the weight given by each union to wage (employment) 
and  (0,1] β ∈  ((1 ) β − ) is the bargaining power of each union (firm). 
We get that the equilibrium wage is 
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∂ +− − − =− < , which implies that, ceteris paribus, as the number of 
domestic firms reduces, it increases the unionised wage in the active domestic firms. 
                                                        
(0,1] δ
5 We may consider  ∈
(0,0.5]
. However, it seems more reasonable to consider that the unions pay 
more attention to employment compared to wage. Hence, we consider  δ ∈ . Also note that the 
presence of union has no real meaning if either  0 δ =  or  0 β = , since the equilibrium wages in 
these situations are equal to the reservation wages irrespective of the number of firms and the trade 
cost.   
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The free entry equilibrium number of domestic firms is determined by  . It is 
immediate from (A3) that a lower t reduces the net profits of the active domestic firms, 
which implies that a lower t reduces the free entry equilibrium number of domestic 
firms. 
* 0 i π =
The above discussion gives us the trade-off mentioned for Proposition 2. On the 
one hand, given n, a lower t reduces  . On the other hand, a lower t tends to 
increase   by reducing the free entry equilibrium number of domestic firms. 
Proposition 2 considers a situation where the unions have full bargaining power and 
give the same weights on wage and employment. In this situation, we can clearly 
show that the above-mentioned second effect dominates the first effect, and a lower t 
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